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Abstract 
Does the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts still 
exist or has it been virtually eliminated? If there are no distinctions and same set of 
rules govern both international and non-international armed conflicts, will the 
international humanitarian law apply as the lex specialis to the exclusion of the 
international human rights law in all armed conflicts, whether international or non-
international in character? This article addresses these issues with the help of legal 
instruments and case laws. 
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Non-international armed conflicts also referred to as internal armed conflicts 
represent the vast majority of armed conflicts in today’s world.1 Generally, they take 
place within the boundaries of a State and comprise of armed conflict between a State 
and armed groups or among armed groups that do not operate under the State’s 
authority.2 However, it does not include internal disturbances like riots, civil strife or 
acts of the like nature. 3  The primary and most important difference between an 
international and a non-international armed conflict is due to the actors who take part 
in them. Traditionally, international armed conflicts are fought between the States, 
which is not the case in non-international armed conflicts. Development of law 
regulating non-international armed conflicts grew in a slower pace compared to that 
of international armed conflict. States were reluctant for any kind of regulation due to 
a perception that it would constitute a violation of its sovereignty and interference in 
its domestic affairs.4 
There was minimum regulation of non-international armed conflict until 1990s. By 
the time of conclusion of Article 3, which is common to the four Geneva 
Conventions, till 1949, international law regulated only those non-international armed 
conflicts which were reaching the level of belligerency or insurgency, while others, 
though few in number were regulated on an ad hoc basis. A broader category of these 
conflicts were regulated in the period between 1949 and early 1990s. In this time, the 
                                               
1 Sandesh Sivakumaran (2011), Re-envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed Conflicts 
European Journal of International Law, 22 (1) 219-219; Yoram Dinstein (2014), Non-International 
Armed Conflicts in International Law (1stedn., Cambridge University Press) 1. 
2 Dieter Fleck (ed) (2008), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (2ndedn, Oxford 
University Press) 605. 
3Michael N. Schmitt, Charles H.B. Garraway and Yoram Dinstein, ‘The Manual on the Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict With Commentary’ (International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2006), 
p. 2,available at 
http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/The%20Manual%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20NIAC.pdf 
accessed 19 November 2016; also seeProtocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to The Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 
Article 1(2). 




Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property and Additional Protocol II 
to the Geneva Conventions, 1949 came into being. However in this period, under the 
customary law, the situation was more uncertain.5 The next stage of regulation began 
in the early 1990s and today there is a clear body of international law that governs 
non-international armed conflict. There are three important bodies of law on the basis 
on which these laws have developed. Firstly, the law of the non-international armed 
conflict is modeled on and integrated to the law of international armed conflict. The 
latter is often seen as a high watermark of legal regulation to which the law of non-
international armed conflict should aspire. Secondly, international criminal law has 
also contributed to the development of the law of non-international armed conflict and 
thirdly, it has drawn on the international human rights law.6 The law regulating non-
international armed conflict had to rely on these three lines majorly because of the 
resistance the States posed to the direct regulation of non-international armed conflict 
through international humanitarian law as mentioned above. Today, it is more widely 
accepted that international law is binding on States in their internal affairs as well, not 
only when it comes to human rights issues but also to norms of international 
humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflicts.7 
I. Treaties and Conventions 
When it comes to treaty law, there are different thresholds for its application in non-
international armed conflict. Article 3, which is common to the Geneva Conventions 
simply refers to ‘the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring 
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties’8, without giving any specific 
                                               
5Ibid., at 220. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Dieter Fleck (ed) (2013), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (3ndedn, Oxford 
University Press) 585.  




definition. There is no requirement of armed groups fighting against the government 
of the territory in which operations are conducted as per the definition. Rather, the 
conflict may be fought between armed groups or between an armed group and the 
State outside the territory of the State.9 Since the threshold of common Article 3 is not 
specified in greater detail, an interpretation as to text, contents and purpose has to 
acknowledge that Article 3 was deliberately confined to few minimum rules, which 
should receive the widest scope of application. It is due to this limitation States 
avoided a more specific definition of the scope of application which probably would 
have been controversial. The concept of ‘armed conflict not of an international 
character’ in itself reflects the dynamics of war in its changing character.10 There is no 
precise definition of that term even in the International Committee for the Red Cross 
Manual. 11  The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter “ICTY”), the Tadić 12 case referred to non-
international armed conflict as a situation of ‘protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within 
a State’. 13  Article 8(2)(f) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court also 
accepts this test and excludes ‘situation of internal disturbances and tensions such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature’ from the 
purview of non-international armed conflict.14 
                                               




12 The Prosecutor v. DuskoTadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, IT-94–1-AR72.  
13 The Prosecutor v. DuskoTadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, IT-94–1-AR72 [70].  




In the years that followed the drafting of the Geneva Conventions, due to the 
changing nature of armed conflict, in terms of methods, means, participants and the 
increase in frequency and brutality of non-international armed conflict, there felt a 
need to develop a new law that was apparent.15 Hence, the Additional Protocol II was 
drafted to address non-international armed conflicts and fill the gaps left by the 
regulatory system of Common Article 3.16 As in the case with Common Article 3, 
Addition Protocol II does not apply to situations of internal disturbance and 
tensions. 17  However, as per Article 1(1) of the Additional Protocol II the rules 
contained therein apply only to armed conflicts which take place on the territory of a 
party ‘between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its 
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations to 
implement this Protocol’.18 This provision applies only to Additional Protocol II and 
is more rigorous than the threshold for the application of Common Article 3.19 It is 
said that in practice, it is often hard to identify situations to which the criteria 
established by Additional Protocol II be applied, especially due to the territorial 
control which it deals with.20 Contrary to Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II 
provides for restriction with respect to its field of application to armed conflict 
between governmental forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
                                               
15Emily Crawford (2007), Unequal before the Law: The Case for the Elimination of the Distinction 
between International and Non-international Armed ConflictsLeiden Journal of International Law, 20 
(2) 441-448. 
16Ibid. 
17Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to The Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Article 1(2). 
18Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to The Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Article 1(1). 
19 Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed) (2012), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (1stedn, 
Oxford University Press) 54. 
20SylvainVite (2009), Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts 




groups.21 The fact that there are different thresholds for the application of Common 
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II shows that there are atleast two types of non-
international armed conflicts, those that are covered by Additional Protocol II (and 
also by Common Article 3) and those that are only covered by Common Article 3.22 
The ICTY, on the other hand, has identified a body of customary international 
humanitarian law, which are equally applicable to international and non-international 
armed conflicts and they include rules such as the prohibition on attacks against 
civilians, attack against civilian objects, prohibition on the wanton destruction of 
property, protection of religious objects and cultural property, prohibition on plunder 
and the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons.23 It was rightly noted in the 
Tadićcase “What is inhumane and consequently proscribed, in international wars, 
cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife”.24As mentioned above, the 
law of non-international armed conflict draws heavily from the law of international 
armed conflict and with respect to legal regulation, the traditional view is that the law 
of international armed conflict remains the pinnacle towards which the law of non-
international armed conflict has to aim.25 
II. Distinction between International and Non-International Armed Conflicts 
Traditionally, law of international armed conflict was applied only to wars between 
States.26 This however changed with the passage of time and the distinction between 
the law of international and non-international armed conflicts were made by the 
                                               
21Y. Sandoz et al. (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, ICRC/Nijhoff M., Geneva/The Hague, 1987 p. 4461 as cited in Ibid. 
22E. Wilmshurst (ed).,supra note 19, at 56. 
23S. Sivakumaran, supra note 1, at 228.  
24 The Prosecutor v. DuskoTadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, IT-94–1-AR72 [119]; Ibid., at 230. 
25S. Sivakumaran, supra note 1, at 232.  
26R. Bartels (2009), ‘Timelines, Borderlines and Conflicts: The Historical Evolution of the Legal 
Divide between International and Non-International Armed Conflicts’ International Review of the Red 




Geneva Conventions of 1949 and further confirmed by the Additional Protocols I and 
II to the Geneva Conventions in 1977. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 in its 
entirety, the Hague Conventions which preceded them and the Additional Protocol I 
apply to the international armed conflicts. These treaties contain the rules relating to 
the conduct of hostilities and rules relating to the protection of those who do not take 
part, or who no longer take part in hostilities. 27 On the other hand, the non-
international armed conflict has limited number of treaty rules applicable on them, as 
explained above, they are restricted to Common Article 3, provisions of the 
Additional Protocol II and Article 8(2)(c) and (e) of the ICC Statute. 
With regard to the actors involved, in international armed conflict, combatants who 
meet the necessary elements generally get a right to participate in armed hostilities, 
which is not the case in non-international armed conflict since the members of armed 
group do not have combatant status.28 Due to the difference in the actors involved in 
the two types of armed conflict, it becomes clear why certain legal norms cannot be 
transposed directly from international armed conflict to non-international armed 
conflict without some modification.29 The test for internationalization was laid down 
in the Tadić case where the Appeals Camber of the ICTY stated, “if an armed conflict 
takes place between two or more States, it is indisputably international. However, an 
internal armed conflict within the territory of a State may also become international 
depending upon the circumstances like those cases where another State intervenes in 
that conflict through its troops or those cases where some participants in the internal 
                                               
27E. Wilmshurst (ed).,supra note 19, at 34-35. 
28D. Fleck (ed) (2008), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (2ndedn), supra note 2, at 
627. 




armed conflict act on behalf of that other State.”30  In the wake of this decision, 
considerable amount of academic debate was seen with scholars arguing that it is 
difficult to apply objective criteria to determine whether an armed conflict is 
international or non-international in character. Some scholars agreed that there needs 
to be a difference in the application of laws while some were of the view that laws 
could be applied universally.31 
Notwithstanding the difference in the nature and regulation of international and non-
international armed conflicts, some scholars are of the view that the distinction 
between them is being eroded and this is evident by the fact that today there is greater 
unity in the laws applicable to these two forms of conflict including the Biological 
Weapons Convention, 1972, the Chemical Weapons Convention 1993 and the Second 
Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property 
1999.32 Some scholars are also of the view that in order to avoid confusion with 
regard to the interpretation of the law, there is a need to adopt a uniform body of rules 
on international humanitarian law like that of international criminal law and 
international human rights law. And the fact that the law of non-international armed 
conflict draws heavily from the law of international armed conflict is a major step in 
that direction.33 Additionally, it is also argued that State practice over the years have 
contributed for the blurring of the legal distinction between international and non-
international armed conflicts. “The evolution of the law points to the fact that basic 
                                               
30 The Prosecutor v. DuskoTadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, IT-94–1-AR72 [84]; James G. Stewart (2003), Towards a single definition of armed 
conflict in international humanitarian law: A critique of internationalized armed conflict International 
Review of the Red Cross, 85 (850) 313- 323. 
31E. Crawford, supra note 15, at 452.  
32L. Moir, ‘Towards the Unification of International Humanitarian Law?’ in R. Burchill, N. White &J. 
Morris (eds), International Conflict and Security Law (2005) 108 as cited inE. Wilmshurst (ed)., supra 
note 19, at 35. 




humanitarian norms are to be applied regardless of whether individuals to be 
protected are combatants or non-combatants, or whether the conflict is international 
or non-international in character. New operating definitions of international and non-
international conflicts are to be evolved keeping in mind factors such as the level of 
violence and the threat to regional and international stability.”34 Some scholars even 
argue that the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts 
is merely a policy error, which needs to be rectified since the distinction does not 
consider the various changes taking place in armed conflict, consequently leaving 
many gaps in the application of humanitarian law.35 
More importantly, it has been argued that customary international law provides for 
broader rules that govern non-international armed conflicts thereby help in filling the 
gaps left by the treaty laws. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTYin the Tadić case also 
noted this. 36  The ICRC takes a similar approach in its comprehensive study of 
customary international humanitarian law, which was published in 2005 and found 
that almost all the rules identified in the study applied both to international and non-
international armed conflicts. 37 Another important argument, which scholars often 
look into is the problematic definition in common Article 3 where “armed conflict not 
of international character” is not precisely defined anywhere. Since it is a negative 
definition it does not convey in exact terms what non-international armed conflict 
                                               
34 M. Bassiouni & P. Manikas, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (1996), 479 as cited in E. Crawford, supra note 15, at 449-450.  
35E. Crawford, supra note 15, at 450.  
36 The Prosecutor v. DuskoTadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, IT-94–1-AR72 [127], “Notwithstanding…limitations, it cannot be denied that customary 
rules have developed to govern internal strife. These rules…cover such areas as protection of civilians 
from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate attacks, protection of civilian objects, in particular 
cultural property, protection of all those who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities, as well 
as prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of certain 
methods of conducting hostilities”; also seeE. Wilmshurst (ed)., supra note 19, at 35. 
37J. M. Henckaerts  & L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law Study (2004) as 




really is.38 Even though Article 3 defines principles of the Conventions, it does not 
contain specific rules with respect to non-international armed conflict.39 The Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTYin the Tadić case also supported the removal of distinction 
between the two categories of armed conflict. The ICTY noted that due to the changes 
that have taken place post Second World War with regard to the increase in the 
number of internal armed conflicts, preserving legal distinction between international 
and non-international armed conflict is unreasonable as the distinction itself had 
begun to fade away with time.40 
However, inspite of the arguments of the scholars who support the elimination of 
distinction between the international and non-international armed conflict, the 
distinction still exists. The scholars who support the distinction argue that elimination 
of distinction would lead to gaps in the overall application of international 
humanitarian law and the protection of the rights of individuals.41 Even in the legal 
sphere certain distinctions between the two types of conflicts do exist. For example, 
the status of actors involved, which is explained above; with respect to public 
property, seizure of military equipment belonging to an adverse party as war booty by 
combatants may be allowed in an international armed conflict and in occupied 
territories they can take public property that can be used for military operations and 
                                               
38J. G. Stewart, supra note 30, at 318. 
39Ibid. 
40 The Prosecutor v. DuskoTadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, IT-94–1-AR72 [97] “In the area of armed conflict the distinction between interstate wars 
and civil wars is losing its value as far as human beings are concerned. Why protect civilians from 
belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or 
private property, as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two sovereign 
States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same 
protection when armed violence has erupted ‘only’ within the territory of a sovereign State? If 
international law, while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually 
turn to the protection of human beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy should 
gradually lose its weight.” 




will not be under an obligation to compensate the State to which it belongs. But, such 
seizures are not regulated by the international law in a non-international armed 
conflict. 42  In an international armed conflict, prisoners of war must be released 
without delay after cessation of hostilities. However, in a non-international armed 
conflict, there is no universal treaty provision on the release of persons deprived of 
their liberty.43 In extreme cases, parties to an international armed conflict may resort 
to reprisals, subject to stringent conditions and where they are not expressly 
prohibited. However, parties to non-international armed conflict do not have to right 
to resort to reprisals.44 
These are some of the cases where the law of international armed conflict cannot be 
applied. If there is an elimination of distinction between international and non-
international armed conflict, then how will one address these issues? Also, in case of 
there being a conflict which is outside the purview of both international and non-
international armed conflicts how will it be addressed in a scenario where there is no 
legal distinction between the two? The sole intention of making all the laws come 
under one canopy might in fact do a lot of injustice with some issues, which deserve 
attention and better laws so that they can be addressed in a just manner. 
III. On lex specialis 
International human rights law consists of a body of laws, which protect human 
beings in all situations. Formally, there is no material limitation on the field of their 
application; they apply in times of peace as well as in times of armed conflict. Bodies 
such as the United Nations Security Council, the UN General Assembly, the UN High 
                                               







Commission and its Special Rapporteurs and the International Court of Justice 
(hereinafter “ICJ”) have re-affirmed the applicability of the International Human 
Rights Law during armed conflicts.45 The ICJ stated that ‘the protection offered by 
human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save for the effect 
of provisions for derogation…’46 Given that the international humanitarian law is 
designed specifically to regulate armed conflict, one may question the need for 
another body of law namely the international human rights law to also apply in a 
situation when the former is applicable.47 The above statement by the ICJ shows the 
importance of the application of the international human rights law during armed 
conflict, which is primarily regulated by the international humanitarian law. 
Traditionally, the rules of the international human rights law were developed to 
address the problems individuals faced during peacetime and at times when they 
confronted their own State.48 On the other hand, international humanitarian laws are 
the laws of war, which regulate the conduct of parties during armed conflicts.49 Even 
though human rights law started as an internal affair of States and humanitarian law 
started as a law between two States with respect to war, with the passage of time and 
development of legal jurisprudence the application of human rights law was seen in 
armed conflicts which subsequently raised questions on the interplay of these two 
branches of international law.50 If both these branches apply in case of an armed 
conflict, then how will they interplay and in case of a dispute which will prevail? The 
                                               
45Orna Ben-Naftali (2011), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law 
(1stedn, Oxford University Press) 50. 
46Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, I.C.J. 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 at 178 [102-106] Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
I.C.J., Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 266 [25]; Ibid., at 50-51. 
47Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah & Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds) (2014), International Human Rights 
Law (2ndedn., Oxford University Press) 483. 
48Orna Ben-Naftali, supra note 45, at 50. 
49  Cordula Droege (2008), Elective affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian LawInternational 





ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case said that this issue could be resolved through the 
maxim lex specialis derogate legi generali. 51  This principle seeks to establish a 
preferential order for two rules or laws that apply to the same scenario but regulate it 
differently. This principle prefers the more special rule over the general rule, since it 
is closer to the particular subject matter and takes better account of the uniqueness of 
the context.52 The principle does not indicate an inherent quality in one branch of law, 
rather it determines which rule or law prevails over the other in a particular scenario. 
Each case must be analyzed individually.53 The ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case 
noted the inter-connectedness between the international humanitarian law and the 
international human rights law and established the lex specialis of international 
humanitarian law.54 It also proposed a parallel application of the two disciplines, 
which acknowledges the continued application of human rights during armed conflict 
but granting some sort of primacy and prevalence to international humanitarian law 
over the international human rights law.55 
The interplay between the two disciplines came up before the ICJ for the second time 
                                               
51Alexander Orakhelashvili (2008), The Interaction between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: 
Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or Convergence? The European Journal of International Law, 19 
(1) 161-169. 
52 Marco Sassoli &Laura M. Olson (2008), The relationship between international humanitarian and 
human rights law where it matters: admissible killing and internment of fighters in non-international 
armed conflicts International Review of the Red Cross, 90 (871) 599, 603-604. 
53 Anja Lindroos (2005), ‘Addressing norm conflicts in a fragmented system: the doctrine of 
lexspecialis’ Nordic Journal of International Law, 74 (1) 42 as cited in Ibid.,at 604. 
54 Nancie Prud’homme (2007), Lexspecialis: Oversimplifying a more complex and multifaceted 
relationship? Israel Law Review, 40 (2) 355-372; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
I.C.J., Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 266 [25], the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life 
applies also in hostilities. The test of what constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then 
must be determined by the applicable lexspecialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict. Thus, 
whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an 
arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to 
the law applicablein armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself. 




in the Israeli Wall56 case, to which the Court proposed three possible situations: “(a) 
some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; (b) others 
may be exclusively matters of human rights law; (c) some others may be matters of 
both. In order to answer this, the Court will have to take into consideration both these 
disciplines of law, namely human rights law and as lex specialis, international 
humanitarian law.”57 There appears to be lack of legal literature with regard to the 
precise definition of lex specialis58 but by a careful perusal of the ICJ’s opinions in 
these cases one can conclude two things, first, where both international humanitarian 
law and international human rights law are applicable, the former tends to prevail as it 
offers more protection in almost every situation for which it has precise set of rules; 
second, human rights law remains applicable at all times including in armed 
conflicts.59 
Inspite of the ICJ’s reliance on the principle of lex specialis, considerable debate has 
sprung up on the issue that this principle does not indicate the dominance of one 
branch of law over the other. According to many scholars, the Court proposed a 
theoretical basis for the parallel application of the two branches of law. However, it 
failed in providing clear guidance or sufficient details on how the maxim lex specialis 
should function thereby falling short of presenting a framework capable of clarifying 
the interplay between the two disciplines. 60 At best, the maxim is a tool of 
interpretation and not a rule to solve dispute between two disciplines of law, as it does 
                                               
56Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, I.C.J. 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136. 
57Ibid., at para 106; also see N. Prud’homme, supra note 54, at 377.  
58 C. Droege, supra note 49, at 523.  
59 Francoise J. Hampson (2008), The relationship between international humanitarian law and human 
rights law from the perspective of a human rights treaty body International Review of the Red Cross, 
90 (871) 549-559. 




not indicate towards a hierarchy of norms.61 Some scholars believe that lex specialis 
is only a technique for resolution of normative conflicts.62 According to the maxim 
lex specialis derogate legi generali, a special norm will prevail over the general norm. 
Yet, the rule is silent as to what is specific and what is general; it does not provide any 
clear guidance to set apart the lex specialis from the lex generalis. 63  The most 
common example used to show the relevance of lex specialis is the violation of right 
to life during an armed conflict. While this example is apt, the principle is of less 
assistance when it comes to many other issues where both international humanitarian 
law and the international human rights law have to be applied together. For instance, 
in a non-international armed conflict where there is no agreed status of combatant and 
there is a potential violation of the right to life, international humanitarian law 
becomes less clear making the application of lex specialis even more difficult.64 
Perhaps due to the difficulty in distinguishing the lex specialis and the lex generalis, 
the maxim appears to have limited use when dealing with situations of detention 
during armed conflicts.65 Hence it can be said that in specific circumstances like that 
of violation of right to life in an armed conflict, the principle of lex specialis 
adequately addresses the interplay between the international humanitarian law and the 
international human rights law, however it is of less assistance in dealing with many 
other complex scenarios that might arise during an armed conflict.66 
In an attempt to solve the confusion surrounding the application of the rule of lex 
                                               
61 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ (Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission, 2006), p. 48, available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf accessed 19 November 2016. 
62A. Lindroos, supra note 53, at 36. 
63N. Prud’homme, supra note 54, at 382.  
64Noam Lubell (2005), Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed ConflictInternational 
Review of the Red Cross, (860) 737,746-750 as cited inN. Prud’homme, supra note 54, at 382.  





specialis, some scholars suggested that a harmonious interpretation be made between 
the two disciplines of law as these two branches complement and not contradict each 
other.67 Hence, according to the principle of complementarity, both human rights and 
humanitarian law are based on similar principles and values and can influence and 
strengthen each other mutually. This principle preserves the idea that international 
law be understood as a coherent system. International law is seen as a regime in 
which different sets of rules and laws cohabit in a harmonious manner. This enables 
the interpretation of human rights in the light of humanitarian law and vice versa.68 
This is reiterated by the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter 
“ECtHR”) in Hassan V. the United Kingdom. 69  The State’s contention that the 
international humanitarian law should apply to the exclusion of international human 
rights law was rejected by the Court which went on to hold that the two bodies of law 
should be applied together and stated that “if the Court accepts the arguments of the 
government, it would be inconsistent with the case law of the International Court of 
Justice which has held that international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law may apply concurrently. It also pointed out that as the ECtHR has 
observed in many occasions, the Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum and 
should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international 
law of which it forms part.”70 
Conclusion 
The paper has attempted to discuss vital issues with regard to international and non-
international armed conflicts and application of international humanitarian law as the 
                                               
67A. Orakhelashvili, supra note 51, at 169. 
68C. Droege, supra note 49, at 529. 





lex specialis. With regard to the issue of whether there should be an elimination of 
distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts it can be said 
that even though there have been strong and valid arguments in favour of the 
elimination of the distinction, the distinction still exists. One of the main reasons for 
the existence of this distinction is the view by States that if non-international armed 
conflicts are equated with international armed conflicts then it would undermine State 
sovereignty and in particular national unity and security. States have been very 
concerned and were reluctant in eliminating the distinction since according to them 
treating non-international armed conflicts in the same way as international armed 
conflicts would encourage secessionist movements by giving them status under 
international law and also restrain the powers of the State in seeking to put down the 
rebellions. 71  For instance, if the rule of combatant immunity, which prevents 
prosecutions of combatants merely for taking part in armed conflict, which is 
applicable in international armed conflicts, is made applicable to non-international 
armed conflicts then States would not able to criminalize acts, which are traditionally 
regarded as constituting treason. These concerns of the States have been reflected in 
treaties as well, like the inclusion of Article 3 in Additional Protocol II according to 
which nothing in the Protocol restricts the responsibility of the State ‘by all legitimate 
means, to maintain or re-establish law and order.’72 
Apart from these concerns, the paper has also dealt with certain issues that might arise 
if there is an elimination of the distinction between international and non-international 
armed conflicts. There are certain issues under non-international armed conflicts 
                                               
71F. Bugnion,‘Jus Ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (2003) 6 Yearbook 
of International Humanitarian Law p. 167-168, available at 
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accessed on 19th November 2016. 




where the law of international armed conflict cannot be applied. Mere intension of 
bringing both the laws under one umbrella might end up in not adequately addressing 
certain issues, which deserve attention. Hence, it can be concluded that the distinction 
between international and non-international armed conflicts still exists and it should 
not be eliminated so that all the issues can be addressed in a just and equitable 
manner.  
With regard to issue of international humanitarian law being the lex specialis and 
being applicable to the exclusion of international human rights law to all armed 
conflicts, international or non-international, the paper has discussed the opinions of 
the International Court of Justice which sees international humanitarian law as lex 
specialis in armed conflicts but also notes the importance of application of 
international human rights law in armed conflicts. It is also made abundantly clear 
that by mere application of international humanitarian law as the lex specialis, the 
application of international human rights law will not cease. However, as the paper 
noted, there are some inherent problems with the application of this maxim, like the 
maxim gives priority to a special rule over the general rule. But it fails to give 
sufficient guidance as to what is lex specialis and lex generalis. While it is true that 
there are certain circumstances where the principle of lex specialis adequately 
addresses the interplay between international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law by regarding international humanitarian law as the lex specialis, it is 
equally true that many other circumstances cannot be addressed by this principle, as 
shown in the paper. 
Hence it is hereby suggested that a harmonious interpretation be made between the 
two disciplines as they complement each other. Once this is done then human rights 




enable in solving various issues that might need the interaction between these two 
branches of international law without there being a priority in application. But the 
problem remains as to how to have a harmonious interpretation of these two 
disciplines of law, which approach an issue in different ways. It is hereby suggested 
that suitable mechanisms be devised including necessary legislations and covenants, 
which will help in a harmonious interpretation of these two branches of law. Hence it 
can be concluded that lex specialis as a principle, falls short in several respects with 
regard to addressing the interplay between the international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law. But by adopting a harmonious interpretation this issue 
can be addressed so that the individual rights are addressed in an appropriate manner 
during an armed conflict. 
**** 
 
